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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. 
Did the the trial judge err in determining that the evidence 
presented at trial required a directed verdict as to the issue of 
the existence of a contract between the parties to settle the 
lawsuit filed by Defendant in the Murray Circuit Court; and 
determining that the Defendant breeched that settlement agreement. 
II. 
Did the trial judge err in instructing the jury with regard 
to the basis for awarding punitive deimages on the claim for abuse 
of process. 
III. 
Is the award of punitive damages reasonable under the 
standards enumerated by this court. 
IV. 
Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's motion for 
remitittur on the issue of punitive damages. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Richard H. VanDyke, the Plaintiff in the trial court is the 
Respondent on appeal. Mountain Coin Machine Distributors, Inc. 
was the Defendant in the trial court and is the Appellant. All 
references to the parties shall be as Plaintiff and Defendant. 
References to the record refer to the transcript of the trial held 
on July 10th and 11th, 1986 and shall be by page and line number. 
Plaintiff owns a restaurant and an amusement game business (T-
4,2). Defendant is a corporation which sells video game equipment 
(T-4#13). In 1983 Plaintiff became interested in the purchase of 
a certain piece of equipment, a Mach I laser disc game (T-4,21). 
Plaintiff contacted the Defendant and made some initial inquiry as 
to this piece of equipment (T-5,5). Ultimately Plaintiff took 
possession of the equipment and signed a delivery receipt, 
acknowledging that he had taken possession (T-6.1C»). After 
several weeks Plaintiff determined that he was uot making enough 
revenue from the game to make it profitable to ke«p the equipment. 
He contacted the Defendant and indicated that he nted to return 
the game. Defendant's agent indicated that it wat he not policy 
of the company to accept returns. Plaintiff believing that it was 
indeed the policy of the company to accept returns, indicated that 
he would send the equipment back to Defendant (T-7,22). Plaintiff 
attempted to return the equipment; but Defendant refused to accept 
delivery(T-9,19). Plaintiff then told the agent of Defendant that 
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he would not pay for the equipment and that Defendant could pick 
it up at his convenience (T-9,23). Defendant did not pick up the 
equipment; and ultimately filed suit against Plaintiff in the 
Murray Circuit Court for the purchase price of the equipment (T-
10,17). Upon being served with a summons and complaint, Plaintiff 
contacted the agent of Defendant and inquired what could be done 
to resolve the lawsuit (T-10,23). Defendant's agent told 
Plaintiff that if he would sign an installment agreement and make 
a down payment of $500.00 the lawsuit would be resolved (I'-
ll, 10). Plaintiff signed the contract and returned it to 
Defendant with a check for $500.00 (T-12,9). The contract is 
dated February 27, 1984. Defendant's records indicate that the 
contract was received back by Defendant at least by March 15, 1984 
(T-80,10). At about the same time as the company acknowledges 
receiving the contract, Defendant's attorney submitted a default 
and default judgment to the court. In addition he submitted an 
abstract of judgment and a motion and order to show cause in 
supplemental proceedings (T-88,6). Plaintiff began making payment 
under the contract (T-13,15). On May 1, 1984 Plaintiff was served 
with the motion and order in supplemental proceedings. The order 
was dated for Plaintiff to appear on May 10, 1984. Upon receiving 
the order Plaintiff contacted Mr. Symes and inquired what was 
going on. Plaintiff testified that during this conversation he 
told Mr. Symes that he had signed the contract and sent the check 
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for the down payment; and asked Mr. Symes why the suit was still 
be pursued. Mr. Symes told Plaintiff that indeed the check and 
contract had been received and that he would not have to appear at 
the court hearing. Plaintiff requested that the attorney for 
Defendant contact him and confirm that he did not have to appear 
(T-14,1). Mr. Kingston did in fact call Plaintiff and did confirm 
that the matter had been taken care of and that Plaintiff would 
not have to appear. Plaintiff testified that during his 
conversation with Mr. Kingston, he informed him that the contract 
had been signed and that the down payment had been sent (T-15,21). 
Mr. Kingston acknowledges that at approximately the time he was 
preparing the default, he spoke to Mr. Symes and learned of the 
conversation regarding the signing of the contract and that the 
contract had been sent to Plaintiff (T-95,15). Plaintiff did not 
appear at the hearing on May 10, 1984. In December of 1984 
Plaintiff went to his bank to obtain some refinancing of some 
short term notes. The loan was to be secured by his residence and 
be for a term of seven years. The loan was to be non-commercial. 
At this time the bank obtained a title report on the Plaintiff's 
home. The report showed the outstanding judgment in the Murray 
Circuit Court which had been docketed in Box Elder District Court 
by Mr. Kingston on April 16, 1984. Based on this judgment the 
bank was not able to make Plaintiff the long term loan that he 
wanted (T-53,7) . Plaintiff informed the bank that the judgment 
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was not supposed to be there and that he would check with the 
attorney for Defendant and get back to them. Plaintiff called Mr. 
Kingston and informed him of what had happened with the bank and 
asked why the judgment was on his property. Mr Kingston told 
Plaintiff that he would check into the matter and let Plaintiff 
know (T-16,19). A few days later Plaintiff received a letter from 
Mr. Kingston stating that he had checked into the matter and found 
that Plaintiff was not current under the payment schedule called 
for in the contract and that there was a parts account which also 
needed to be paid. Mr. Kingston stated that due to these facts he 
could not release the lien (Exhibit No. 3). Thereafter Mr. 
Kingston initiated a second motion and order in supplemental 
proceedings against Plaintiff and had he served with an order to 
appear in the Murray Circuit Court. The motion and order 
indicated that the full amount of the judgment was still 
unsatisfied (T-18,25). Plaintiff then contacted a lawyer and had 
the lawyer contact Mr. Kingston. This attorney wrote Mr. 
Kingston and informed him that Plaintiff had signed an installment 
contract with Defendant which would have been an accord and 
satisfaction of the original debt (T-19,16) (Exhibit No. 5). 
Plaintiff's attorney prepared a stipulation and order setting 
aside the judgment in the Murray Circuit Court and set it to Mr. 
Kingston (T-100,12). The judgment was set aside on the docket of 
the First District Court on June 19# 1985 (T-29,8). Plaintiff 
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ultimately obtained the long term financing, although in the 
interim he was required to roll over the short term notes several 
times and had to provide the bank with certain information and 
documentation that was not origianlly required (T-56,5). 
Plaintiff brought suit for abuse of process and breech of 
contract. Defendant counterclaimed for the balance owed on the 
installment contract and on the open account. The trial court, 
sitting with a jury, awarded Plaintiff $250.00 in actual dciages, 
the amount that Plaintiff paid his attorney to get the judgment 
set aside, and $37,000.00 in punitive damages. The court gave 
Defendant an offset for the amount owed on the balance of the 
installment contract and open account (Judgment on Jury Verdict). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in determining that a contract 
existed between the parties for the settlement of the Murrciy 
Circuit Court lawsuit. The evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff 
had a conversation with the employee of Defendant, Mr. Symes with 
regard to resolving the suit. The evidence is undisputed that the 
Plaintiff signed the installment contract and sent it to Defendant 
along with a $500.00 down payment. Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Defendant it is undisputed that the 
contract and down payment were received by Defendant at least by 
the 15t; of March, 1984, which is prior to the date that the 
judgment by default was entered and the abstract of that judgment 
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sent to Box Elder District Court. The evidence is also undisputed 
that the Defendant accepted installment payments from Plaintiff 
after receiving the contract. Defendant also counterclaimed 
against Plaintiff for the balance due on the installment contract. 
A reasonable juror could not find that a contract did not exist 
between the parties to resolve or settle the Murray Circuit 
lawsuit; and that Defendant breeched that agreement. 
The instruction of the trial judge with respect to the 
finding required to support an award of punitive damages was 
correct. The trial judge in instruction number 9 gave the jury 
the appropriate instruction with respect to the basis for awarding 
punitive damages. Interrogatory No. 3 also is an appropriate 
instruction. The judge instructed the jury that it must find that 
the Defendant intentionally abused the civil process with the 
intent to cause the Plaintiff stress or pain; or to gain an unfair 
advantage over the Plaintiff. This instruction is consistent with 
this court's holdings that punitive damages may only be awarded in 
cases involving malice or reckless indifference for the rights of 
another. The use of the civil process for the purpose of 
inflicting pain or stress; or for gaining an unfair creditor's 
advantage is equatable to malice; or reckless disregard for the 
rights of another. Further, Defendant made no objection to 
interrogatory No. 3 at the time of trial. Lastly, even if the 
judge did not properly instruct the jury with respect to abuse of 
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process, the award of punitive damages could stand on the 
malicious breech of contract alone. 
The award of punitive damages in this case is appropriate 
under the factors enumerated by this court, ie., the nature of the 
conduct, the relative wealth of the Defendant, the effect on the 
life of the Plaintiff and the possibility of a recurrence. 
Further this award serves the purposes for which punitive damages 
are designed, ie. to punish this wrongdoer, to prevent the 
Defendant or others from similar conduct in the future and to 
remove the profit to Defendant of this type of conduct. 
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for 
remitittur on the issue of punitive damages. The court found that 
under the particular facts of this case the the award of punitive 
daraages was justified; and that the amount of the award serves the 
intended purpose of punishing the Defendant, removing the profit 
to Defendant of this type of activity and deterring the Defendant 
and others from similar conduct in the future. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial judge did not err in determining that the evidence 
presented at trial required a directed verdict on the issue of the 
existence of a settlement agreement and the fact that Defendant 
breeched that agreement. 
Defendant contends tha the court should have allowed the 
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jury to decide if an agreement existed betv/een the parties wherein 
the Plaintiff agreed to sign an installment contract, make a down 
payment of $500.00 and thereafter make regular monthly payments; 
and wherein the Defendant agreed to abandon the Murray Circuit 
Court action. The court determined that the contract existed and 
that neither party had abandoned the contract. As a result the 
court ordered the jury to award Plaintiff the damages that it 
found he had suffered by the preponderance of the evidence, if 
any (Interrogatory No. I). The court further determined that 
Defendant was also entitled to damages for the unpaid balance of 
the installment contract and open accounts sought on counterclaim 
(Judgment on Jury Verdict). 
The evidence supports the trial court's determination that 
reasonable jurors could not disagree over the existence of this 
contract and the fact that Defendant breeched this agreement. The 
undisputed evidence is that after being served with a summons and 
complaint, the Plaintiff called the Defendant's agent, Merlin 
Symes, and inquired, in the words of Mr. Symes, what could be done 
to resolve the lawsuit (T-79,17). Mr. Symes told the Plaintiff 
that if he would sign an installment contract that would resolve 
the lawsuit. The evidence is undisputed that the Plaintiff signed 
the installment contract and sent it to Defendant with the $500.00 
down payment. Even Defendant's own records indicate that the 
signed contract was in their possession by no later than March 15, 
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1984 (T-80,6). The testimony of the then attorney for Defendant 
is that on or about the 14th of March he submitted to the court, 
the default judgment, motion and order in supplemental proceedings 
and abstract of judgment (T-88,9). The record is clear, however, 
that the judgment was not signed before March 20, 1984 (T-105,19) 
(Exhibit 17). The motion and order in supplemental proceeding was 
not served on the Plaintiff until May 1, 1984 (T-14,17). The date 
of docket of the abstract of judgment in the First District Court 
is April 13, 1984 (T-29,4). All of these events took place after 
the Defendant admittedly had the installment contract in hand. 
Had the Defendant been so inclined, it could have easily stopped 
the judgment from being entered, the motion and order in 
supplemental proceedings from being issued and the abstract of 
judgment from being entered in the First District Court. Whether 
the failure of Defendant was intentional or unintentional, it 
constituted a breech of what Defendant agreed to do, ie. resolve 
the lawsuit. 
It is also undisputed that the Defendant accepted the down 
payment from Plaintiff, accepted his regular monthly payments 
and filed a counterclaim seeking the balance of the installment 
contract. The Defendant was in fact given an offset for the 
balance of the installment contract. Clearly, reasonable minds 
could find nothing other than the trial judge did, ie. that the 
contract existed and that the Defendant breeched that contract. 
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POINT II 
The trial judge did not err in instructing the jury with 
regard to awarding punitive damages for abuse of process. 
The judge instructed the jury that it must find that the 
Defendant intentionally abused the civil process with the intent 
to cause the Plaintiff stress or pain; or to gain an unfair 
advantage over the Plaintiff. This instruction is consistent with 
this court's holdings that punitive damages may only be awarded in 
cases involving malice or reckless indifference for the rights of 
another. In the case of Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), this court stated "Our cases have 
generally held that punitive damages may be awarded only on proof 
of "willful and malicious" conduct, or on proof of conduct which 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and 
disregard of the rights of others..." 
Defendant urges that the judge should have required the jury 
to find "actual malice" as this court required in McFarland v. 
Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). While it is 
clear that the holding in this case refers only to claims for 
false arrest, the instruction of the judge in Interrogatory No. 
Ill is consistent with the definition of "actual malice", ie. done 
with the intent of to cause stress or pain. The reckless 
indifference standard as set forth in Behrens, is likewise 
consistent with the judge's instruction with regard to the intent 
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to gain an unfair advantage. If Defendant acted to gain an unfair 
advantage over Plaintiff, then Defendant acted with knowing and 
reckless indifference toward the rights of Plaintiff. In the 
explanation to Interrogatory No. Ill, the court was merely 
tailoring the reckless indifference standard to the facts this 
particular case and the claim of abuse of process. 
The explanation in Interrogatory No. Ill, coupled with 
Instruction No. 9, adequately and properly instructed the jury 
with regard to awarding punitive damages for abuse of process. 
Further, the Defendant raised no objection to Interrogatory III 
at the time of trial (T-128,4). Lastly, the jury's award of 
punitive damages can be based either on the claim of breech of 
contract or the claim of abuse of process (Interrogatory No. IV). 
POINT III 
The award of punitive damages is reasonable under the fcictors 
enumerated by this court and serves the purpose for which punitive 
damages were intended. 
In Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) 
this court stated "Some factors that should have been considered 
by both the jury and the trial judge in determining the amount of 
the award are: the relative wealth of the defendant, the nature of 
his alleged misconduct, the facts and circumstances surrounding 
such misconduct, the effect thereof upon the lives of plaintiff 
and others, the probability of future recurrence of the 
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misconduct, the relationship between the parties, and the amount 
of actual damages awarded". See also Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 
723 (Utah 1983), First Security Bank v^ J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 
591 (Utah 1982) and Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). Clearly the major area of 
concern in this case is the amount of punitive damages in 
comparison to the award of actual damages; yet determining the 
reasonableness of an award cannot be just a question of comparing 
the actual damages to the punitive damages. It would seem from 
the factors enumerated by the court in Bundy, that other 
circumstances may dictate that the award of punitive damages be 
substantially higher the the award of actual damages. If it is 
true that the facts of a particular case may support such a 
disproportionate award, then this is such a case. In this case 
the undisputed evidence presented at trial is that the Defendant 
corporation has assets worth in excess of a million and a quarter 
dollars (Exhibit 15). With such resources the Defendant could 
easily absorb the actual damages and even a lesser amount of 
punitive damages and still feel no sting. Punitive damages which 
are not a punishment to this Defendant, because of its wealth, are 
not punitive at all and do not serve their purpose. In Bundy, the 
court overturned a disproportionate award of punitive damages; but 
in that case there was no evidence of wealth at all let alone such 
wealth as the Defendant has in this case. 
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It is appropriate that several of the factors set forth above 
deal with the conduct of the wrongdoer. It would be an 
appropriate paraphrase to say that the jury should make the 
punishment fit the crime. In this case the defendant acting in 
large part through its attorney, a person who presumably is 
charged with a high standard of conduct, allowed a default 
judgment to stay of record knowing that the same had been 
satisfied by a settlement agreement between the parties. Further 
this attorney allowed an abstract of that judgment to stay of 
record in t First District Court when he knew that the 
underlying judgment should not have been entered. This attorney 
later refused to remove the judgment lien when requested to do so 
by the Plaintiff; and he used the existence of this judgment to 
attempt to collect payment of not only the installment contract 
but a seperate account as well. And finally this attorney had the 
Plaintiff served with a supplemental order. An attorney, such as 
Mr. Kingston, clearly understands the civil process and the effect 
that his actions would have on Pi iintiff. He understood that by 
allowing the judgment to stay of record in the First District 
Court he was allowing a lien to stay on Plaintiff's real property. 
Mr. Kingston was informed by Plaintiff that the existence of this 
lien was interfering with a loan transaction that the Plaintiff 
was attempting to consummate with his bank. Faced with this 
knowledge Mr. Kingston not only refused to release the lien; but 
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told Plaintiff that he would not do so until the installment 
contract and a seperate open account were paid* Mr. Kingston knew 
that the judgment in the Murray Circuit Court should have been set 
aside; and yet he continued to use the pressure of this judgment 
to intimidate Plaintiff when he had him served with a second 
supplemental order- The conduct of the Defendant through its 
employee and attorney is not just an isolated, single incident 
motivated by some ill-informed idea of debt collection; but rather 
was a ongoing series of actions by one who knew the consequences 
of his actions and the effect they would have on Plaintiff. 
The actions of Defendant in this case justify a larger award 
of punitive damages compared to the actual damages. It is also 
important to note that the only reason the actual damages were not 
considerably higher is that Plaintiff ultimately obtained the 
longer term financing he was seeking. 
The effect of Defendant's conduct upon Plaintiff is clear. 
The Plaintiff was frustrated in his attempts to obtain financing. 
It is clear that Defendant attempted to use the judgment to apply 
pressure and stress on the Plaintiff. It is clear from the 
evidence that the existence of the judgment and lien cost the 
Plaintiff time, the time it took to periodically renew loans and 
to supply his bank with additional information. It is clear from 
the evidence, that the Plaintiff felt the anxiety of a laymen 
dealing with the existence of a lien upon his home and with court 
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orders being served upon him; and not completely understanding 
what all of it meant. 
There is a high degree of probability that the actions of the 
Defendant will recur unless there is a substantial deterrent to 
Defendant. The Defendant is a company which deals on a daily 
basis with people like Plaintiff. Defendant had at the time of 
trial, approximately $645,000.00 in accounts receivable. If there 
is no substantial penalty placed Defendant for what it did to 
Plaintiff, there is every likelihood that Defendant will continue 
to use such tactics with other debtors. And given the large 
number of accounts held by the Defendant, a small award of 
punitive damages in this case would not remove the profitability 
to Defendant in such collection tactics. 
POINT IV 
The trial court did not err in denying Defendants motion for 
remitittur. 
Defendant made the argument to the court in a motion for 
remitittur, that the disproportionate award of punitive damages 
required that the court alter the jury verdict. Plaintiff meide 
the argument to the court that the factors set forth above 
justified the award of punitive damages. The trial court found 
Plaintiff's argument to be persuasive and denied Defendant's 
motion. If this court accepts Plaintiff's argument that the facts 
of this case justify the award c: mitive damag en the trial 
i -
court did not err in doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
The court properly determined that the issue of the existence 
of a settlement contract and the breech thereof by Defendant were 
not factually in dispute. The court also properly instructed the 
jury with respect to punitive damages for abuse of process. The 
amount of punitive damages is justified in this case because of 
the wealth of Defendant, the nature of Defendant's misconduct, the 
effect that the conduct had on Plaintiff and the high degree of 
probability that such conduct will recur. The trial court did not 
err in accepting Plaintiff's argument that the amount of the award 
was justified. The decision of the jury in the lower court should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this /y<J4\ day of February, 1987. 
'•ri^frN 
:hael W. Milxer 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff / Respondent 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I 
Plaintiff has asked for an award of actual and punitive 
damages against the Defendant based on Plaintiff's claims of 
tortious interference with a business transaction and abuse of 
process. 
Actual or compensatory damages are those which compensate 
an injured person for all injuries and losses sustained as a 
result of another person's wrongful act. On the other hand, 
exemplary or punitive damages are those which serve to punish a 
wrongdoer for his unlawful act and to deter the wrongdoer and 
others from like conduct in the future. 
If you find that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
actual damages and you further find that in doing the acts 
complained of, the Defendant acted willfully, wantonly, or 
maliciously, you may, but you are not required to, award the 
Plaintiff exemplary or punitive damages in such a sum as would 
in your opinion, punish the Defendant for its unlawful act and 
deter it and others from committing like acts in the future. 
-4-
INTERROGATORY NO, III 
1. DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEES AND/OR LAWYER INTENTIONALLY 
USED ILLEGALLY "ABUSED THE PROCESS" BY UNLAWFULLY FILING 
OR ALLOWING AN INVALID JUDGMENT TO BE CONTINUED IN BOX 
ELDER COUNTY TO GAIN AN ILLEGAL CREDITORS ADVANTAGE OF 
A DEBTOR? 
"YES" ^ 
"NO" 
Explanation; The tort of "abuse of process" is present when 
a person pretends to be using legal use of process for a purpose 
but intentionally use it for a different purpose or to inflict 
unnecessary stress or pain. An example may be when a creditor 
refuses to remove a mortgage or lien in an attempt to force a 
payment on a different debt. The plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant's employees and/or lawyer has done that in this case. 
The defendant denied this and asserts they made an honest mistake. 
The issue is submitted to the jury. 
The distinguishing between a "malicious breach of contract" 
and "abuse of process" generally is that the "abuse of process" 
that involves the use of court process where an intentional 
breach of contract may or may not involve an abuse of process. 
If the plaintiff proves an abuse of process the law permits the 
award of punitive damages. 
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff on this issue. 
. Miller 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX ELDEP COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. VANDYKE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE 
DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
Defendant. 
) JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
) Civil No. 19389 
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly for 
trial on the 10th day of July, 1986; and the Plaintiff having been 
present in person and represented by counsel, Michael L. Miller; 
and the Defendant having been present by and through its agent and 
represented by counsel, Dennis K. Poole; and the court, the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist District Judge presiding, having 
empaneled a jury; and the parties having thereafter presented 
evidence to the jury; and the court having determined that as a 
matter of law, certain issues were not in dispute; and the jury 
thereafter having retired to deliberate the issues remaining in 
dispute; and having so deliberated having returned a special 
verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarding Plaintiff $250.00 in 
damages for breech of contract and $37,000.00 in punitive damages 
for intentional and malicious breech of contract and and for abuse 
of process; and the court having ordered that judgment be entered 
on said special verdict, and that in said judgment, an offset be 
given to Defendant for the sums due and owing Plaintiff on the 
balance of the installment contract and the open account in the 
amounts of $1493.98 and $775.93 respectively; now 
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff, RICHARD H. VANDYKE, be and is hereby awarded judgment 
against the Defendant, MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
as follows: 
1. $34,980.09 in compensation and punitive damages; 
2. $357.74 in costs; 
3. Interest on the total judgment at the lawful rate from the 
date hereof until collected and costs of the court hereinafter 
accruing. 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
John F. Wahlquist-District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT to Defendant's attorney, 
postage prepaid, at: 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
Attorney at Law 
Prowswood Plaza, Suite 306 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 Case No. 19389 
The defendant has made a motion for a new trial and/or 
in the alternative for a reduction in the punitive damage award. 
The Court here denies those motions. 
When the Court considers a motion such as the one before 
it, it must not substitute its own judgment for that of the 
jury. The Court is not particularly bothered by that rule in 
this case, because the Court's own view is that there was good 
reason to grant substantial punitive damages. If the Court gives 
due consideration to the jury's findings, it would find facts as 
indicated below. 
FACTS 
1. The plaintiff is a businessman in Brigham City, Box 
Elder County. He conducts a restaurant business there, and also 
has a business that might be called an arcade, that is where 
people play video games, etc. The defendant is in the business 
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of selling the coin machines to arcades. The plaintiff became 
interested in a very complicated machine, wherein the player 
participated in general as though he was the pilot of an 
aircraft. Plaintiff and defendant eventually reached an agree-
ment and entered into a contract wherein plaintiff was to 
purchase the machine and pay a sum of monies on an installment 
basis for it. 
2. The machine was delivered and installed on the 
plaintiff's premises. The machine performed exactly as it 
should. The difficulty was that for some reason the teenagers, 
or customers, were not attracted to the machine in sufficient 
numbers that the continued placement of the machine on plain-
tiff's premises was economically justified. Plaintiff attempted 
to force the defendant to accept the return of the machine* The 
defendant stood on its rights and refused delivery, and informed 
the plaintiff that he would be held to the contract. 
3. The defendant transferred the contract to a 
subsidiary corporation. This corporation was a finance company. 
In general the finance company took the position that it was a 
bonafide purchase for value, and that they were not subject to 
any defenses the plaintiff might assert in the nature of a right 
to return the machine. This frustrated the plaintiff. The 
general situation suggests that this set up had been engineered 
in part to frustrate persons such as the plaintiff, or persons in 
the plaintiff's position. 
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4. The defendant filed suit against the plaintiff on 
the contract. The parties eventually re-negotiated a settlement 
that occurred between the plaintiff and one of the two corpora-
tions. The payments were in part delinquent at timesf but in 
general were made pursuant to the contract. The other corpora-
tion continued the suit and secured a default judgment in Salt 
Lake Countyf in Murray Circuit Court. This default was entered 
by the defendant without the plaintiff's knowledge, and was a 
complete surprise to the plaintiff, because it occurred after it 
settled. 
5. Plaintiff contacted the defendant corporation and 
requested that they remove the judgment, inasmuch as the cause of 
action under which the judgment was taken had been negotiated and 
settled, and that, therefore, the judgment was invalid. The 
judgment was filed in Box Elder County. 
6. Eventually the defendant caused the plaintiff to be 
informed by an attorney that the judgment would not be removed 
because the plaintiff owed a separate sum of money on an open 
account to the defendant. The plaintiff took the view that this 
was an abuse of process. Plaintiff attempted to have the 
judgment removed. It was terribly upsetting to him as he was 
attempting to refinance his home. The general mortgage rates had 
dropped. He believed he could not do so because of the existence 
of a judgment against him. His evidence of damages in this 
respect failed. The bank indicated that they probably would have 
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rewritten the plaintiff's contract at any time he desired them to 
because of their personal acquaintance and respect for the 
plaintiff, but that the rate of interest would not have dropped/ 
because they were charging 1% above prime on all commercial 
transactions, and this would be regarded as such a loan. The 
jury likely determined that the judgment was left on the books 
for a improper purpose, and that it was done deliberately and 
knowingly by the attorney who served both corporations and the 
business heads for each company. 
7. The plaintiff employed an attorney who requested the 
judgment be removed. He later charged the plaintiff $250 to 
threaten suit if the judgment was not removed. After the threat 
was made, time passed, and eventually the judgment was removed. 
The plaintiff then filed this suit for abuse of process, to-wit: 
the taking of an invalid judgment in Murray Circuit Court, and 
the docketing of it in Box Elder County for an improper purpose, 
and the refusal to remove it for an improper purpose. 
8. The jury awarded actual damages in the amount of 
$250. This is exactly the sum claimed as attorney's fees paid by 
the plaintiff to his lawyer to threaten suit and get the judgment 
removed. 
9. Some evidence as to the wealth of the defendant was 
received. The usual instructions on punitive damages were given. 
10. The jury then awarded $37,000 as and for punitive 
damages as punishment against the parent company. 
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ISSUE 
There are many Utah decisions in which there are 
discussions that there should exist some relationship between 
actual damages suffered and punitive damages awarded* Some of 
these judgments would suggest that punitive damages are excessive 
when they exceed three or four times the actual damages 
suffered* Most of the cases that take this approach are cases in 
which there are no actual evidence as to the defendant's net 
worth or as to its wealth. There is in this case an exhibit 
which shows that the defendants were prepared to acknowledge 
during discovery that the net worth of the parent corporation was 
at least one and one-half million dollars. The plaintiff's 
attorney argued the case to the jury; that the abuse of process 
was obvious and clear; and done by corporation counsel of the two 
corporations; and also with full knowledge of the heads of the 
defendant corporation. There is circumstantial evidence to 
support this argument. Plaintiff's counsel further argued to the 
jury that to award a few hundred or a few thousand dollars in 
this case as punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. The 
company could absorb such losses painlessly and continue to do 
this type of a practice to enforce collection of debt. The 
attorney further argued that if the debtor's rights are to be 
enforced at all in a case like thisf there would have to be an 
award of sufficient punitive damages that a debtor could afford 
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to bring the lawsuit against them and also such a sum of money 
that it would remove the profits which a corporationf or a 
corporation with subsidiariesf might enjoy through misuse of this 
collection device. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah authorities/ and the federal authorities, have 
been faced with this type of an issue before. These authorities 
consider the wealth of the defendant, its motive, and the amount 
of judgment which would be necessary to remove any probable 
profit from continuing the practice by defendant and others so 
situated. It is the plaintiff's position that a judgment in the 
amount here awarded is appropriate for those purposes. 
This particular litigation resembles other litigations 
the Court has witnessed. At times creditors are in a position to 
take unjustified advantages over their debtors. There are 
penalties built into the Commercial Code intending to stop this 
type of practice. This particular action is not brought under 
the Commercial Code. It is brought appropriately under the tort 
law for abuse of process. The amount of punitive damages, which 
should and can be awarded, is not capable of an exact 
measurement. In general, it would have to be a sufficient sum 
that a defendant of this size, that does its business through 
corporations, has attorneys on retainer, etc., would find it 
unprofitable to do this type of thing to debtors in the future. 
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The Court has considered what sum would be proper. It 
has considered sums of $10f000, $25,000, and the $37,000 award. 
The Court recognizes that this was deliberate misconduct done 
under the advise of an attorney. The Court recognizes that the 
defendant does a large retail business in its own name and an 
undisclosed amount of business through subsidiary corporations. 
The Court finds that it cannot, in its discretion, say that this 
sum is excessive. The Court saw no evidence of anger or 
animosity among the jurors. The Court notes that jurors did 
include persons of business experience and sophistication. The 
Court finds that it must respect the jurors' judgment. 
- ? 1 
DATED this 'j?<± >dav of September, 1986. 
^ / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
.JOHN P . WAHLQUIST, judge 
f 
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